PETN Could Have Downed Plane

Medium Yield Explosvie-PETN

According to unnamed sources in a Washington Post article, the total amount of the explosive PETN (Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate) carried by suspected terrorist Abdulfarouk Umar Muttalab, was more than sufficient to have disabled the plane.

To those in the counter-terrorism community, this incident exposes a number of gaps in screening procedures used internationally, and the problems associated with trying to instill global standards on such an enterprise. It appears that terrorists continue to exploit less stringent screening by carefully selecting their points of departure, as was the case with the 9/11 hijackers.

But the incident also calls into account our own information sharing procedures and “no fly” lists. By all accounts, this suspect should have raised a number of red flags that when taken together would have singled him out for additional screening, or a denial of his Visa. Unfortunately, the current system does a poor job of tying these markers together.

What measures were taken to protect commercial aviation against PETN being carried inside underwear or even anal cavities? This method of attack was used by a Saudi suicide-bomber, Abdullah Hassan al Asiri in August of 2009. He attempted to murder the Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister using very similar methods, and was also backed by a cell based in Yemen.

Were travelers departing Yemen subject to any increased screening after that incident? Were additional “puffer” machines, explosive sniffing dogs, or other measures increased for passengers leaving Yemen?

It may well be that the American intelligence community suffers from it’s own vast global dominance, being too slow to react to a nimble foe. The incident involving a PETN attack sewn into underwear occurred late in August, barely four months ago. In an entrenched bureaucracy four months is barely enough time to study such an incident, much less to deploy effective countermeasures. But to small, agile organizations like the cells utilized by our enemies, four months is more than enough time to organize another attack.

Equally puzzling is why terrorists remain fixated on commercial aviation as a target, especially when soft targets abound both domestically and internationally. The lack of Central leadership may be the reason. Individual actors and small cells are left to plan and execute their own attacks, resulting in a series of “copycat” attacks based on previous attempts.

Regardless of the outcome of the reviews underway now, Americans may have to come to grip with another reality that the rest of the world takes for granted. No amount of screenings, watch lists, or restrictions on activity within an aircraft can guarantee 100% safety. We must balance our desire for security with essential liberty, and accept that any conflict will generate casualties. Learning to accept those casualties is necessary unless we wish to see our society transformed into a unrecognizable police state.

For many, the screening procedures already in place have resulted in the choice to travel less often by air. Increasing those restrictions will surely result in more travelers reaching the same conclusion. These attacks are slowly changing the view of air travel and it’s usage by Americans–and achieving at least a moral victory for the terrorists.